Web Wars: NGOs, Companies and Governments in an Internet-Connected World(*). (nongovernmental organizations)(Statistical Data Included) John Bray.

Full Text: COPYRIGHT 1998 Greenleaf Publishing

THIS ARTICLE begins with a broad analysis of the strategies employed by NGOs in their use of the Internet, and the companies' responses. It focuses on two case studies: the international human rights campaign on Burma (Myanmar), and the NGO campaign against the OECD's proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). The article concludes with a general discussion of the changing relationship between companies, governments and NGOs, and the implications for the wider debate on the environment, human rights and sustainable development. The argument is made that, by making certain kinds of information more widely available, the Internet changes the balance of power between NGOs, companies and governments. In particular, the wider distribution of information puts greater pressure on companies to explain their activities in countries and regions that previously were considered obscure; and it makes it more difficult for companies and governments to conduct confidential negotiations on issues such as trade and investment.

Introduction

Knowledge itself is power. Francis Bacon (1561-1626)

QUESTIONS of power and accountability lie at the heart of the debate between companies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Advocacy NGOs point to the sheer size of today's major international companies. For example, multinational companies are said to account for 51 out of the world's largest 100 economic entities, with the remaining 49 being countries (Understanding Global Issues 1997). Groups campaigning on issues such as the environment and human rights therefore seek to ensure that companies use their power responsibly. In contrast, business people tend to question the real extent of their power and the scope of their responsibilities.(1)

The Internet is a medium, not a message. The technology does not of itself change the quality of the arguments presented on either side. But, by making certain kinds of information more widely available, the Internet changes the balance of power between NGOs, companies and governments. In particular, the wider distribution of information puts greater pressure on companies to explain their activities in countries and regions that previously were considered obscure; and it makes it more difficult for companies and governments to conduct confidential negotiations on issues such as trade and investment.

This article begins with a broad analysis of the strategies employed by NGOs in their use of the Internet, and companies' responses. It focuses on two case studies: the international human rights campaign for Burma (Myanmar), and the NGO campaign against the OECD'S proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). The article concludes with a general discussion of the changing relationship between companies, governments and NGOs, and the implications for the wider debate on the environment, human rights and sustainable development.

NGOs and the Internet

NGOs have been swift to make full use of the Internet. Increasingly, the mainstream press and broadcasting media are dominated by governments, conglomerates and `moguls' because of the large investments and operating costs involved. In contrast, anyone with a computer and a modern can set up a website at minimum cost: the medium lends itself to `network guerrillas' (Jonquieres 1998). These `guerrillas' have used the Internet first as a source of information but, secondly--and more importantly--as a means of co-ordinating their activities regionally, nationally and internationally.

A Source of Information

The Internet both supplies NGOs with greater information on their campaign issues and allows them to spread information on those same issues, whether these relate to countries, companies, or both.

Information on Countries

Internet sources on Tibet--a country that was formerly a byword for remoteness and obscurity--demonstrate both the medium's strengths and its limitations as a source of information. Specialist information sources include: World Tibet News (WTN), a free e-mail cuttings service;(2) the non-partisan London-based Tibet Information Network (TIN; www.tibetinfo.net); and the Free Tibet Campaign (FTC; www.freetibet.org), which explicitly campaigns for Tibetan independence. In addition to these specialist news sources, information on current events in Tibet may be found on academic sites and the websites of other organisations with broader mandates, such as the BBC World Service or Amnesty International.

The range of readily available information on Tibet is therefore unparalleled in comparison with any previous period in the country's history, but there are still limitations. All these different sources need to be read critically: the Internet may be neutral, but information-providers are not. Moreover, Chinese censorship is still effective within Tibet: it is very difficult to get `the whole picture' from any source or combination of sources.

So far, few mainstream Western companies have shown a serious interest in Tibet: Holiday Inn formerly managed a hotel in Lhasa, but became the target of a FTC campaign and has now withdrawn. No mainstream Western company could expect to operate in Tibet--however remote it may seem--without its activities being closely monitored.

Information on Companies

Advocacy groups are alert to the Web's potential as a source of information on the activities of large companies. For example, the Washington-based Environmental Resources Information Network (ERIN) publishes an activist's guide to resources for researching corporations on its website (www.enviroweb.org). ERIN'S objective is to help smaller environmental groups improve their access to information so that they are on a more equal footing both with larger, national environmental organisations and--on the other side of the fence--with companies from the extractive industries. ERIN points to a range of different sources, including both online and printed business publications, academic libraries--and the websites of NGOs such as Corporate Watch (www.corpwatcb.org) that specialise in monitoring multinationals.

A Campaign Tool

The Internet facilitates many existing NGO activities, such as organising petitions, as well as making it easier to share information between allied groups and their supporters. The new technology also makes it possible to conduct new kinds of campaign, such as `electronic direct action'.

Spreading the Message

The Web provides NGOs with a `shop window' from which to advertise their own existence, explain their arguments and recruit new members. NGOs have often displayed great imagination in their website designs, making full use of the medium's capacity to display images and sound, as well as text.

For example, the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) offers viewers a video library, art and photo galleries and a section entitled `Just for Kids', as well as information on its latest campaigns on climate change, forests and the seas (www.panda.org). In early November 1998, the Greenpeace UK site (www.greenpeace.org) offered live broadcasts of six Greenpeace activists conducting a six-day protest on the Piz Buin glacier in the Austrian Alps to draw attention to the consequences of global climate change. Greenpeace offers viewers the chance to become `cyberactivists'; join mailing lists; or become citizens of `Waveland' (`a global country situated on the World Wide Web').

These and similar NGO sites almost always contain `links', cross-referring readers to the websites of other organisations who are interested in similar issues.

Letters and Petitions

Since its foundation in the early 1960s, Amnesty International has been calling on its supporters to write letters to government officials on behalf of prisoners of conscience. Similar letterwriting campaigns have been used by other groups campaigning on environmental and other issues. New technology now makes it possible to send such `letters' by fax or e-mail. For example, over a three-day period in early December 1998, Norwegian students sent some 200,000 e-mail messages to leading politicians in protest over a rise in interest rates on student loans (Independent 1998).

Many NGOs make this form of protest even easier by including direct links from their websites to the e-mail or fax addresses of their `targets'. For example, several us sites include the e-mail addresses of members of Congress, while the uK-based World Development Movement (www.wdm.org) invites readers to write to the chairman of Rio Tinto. Readers have only to click on to the relevant addresses, write and `sign' their messages--and send them off. By way of literary variation, the Rainforest Action Network (RAN) website until recently invited readers to get in touch with their `inner poets' and send a haiku to the president of Mitsubishi Corporation to protest against the company's timber operations.

Organising

In the 1970s and 1980s, anti-apartheid activists operated complicated telephone networks to spread urgent messages: individual activists undertook to ring, say, three others to inform them of forthcoming demonstrations or other protests. The Internet makes it much easier to advertise and co-ordinate campaigns. For example, in the UK, protesters involved in the movement against road-building--`Reclaim the Streets'--send information to each other about where and when to meet for forthcoming protest marches. The ability of e-mail to help a disparate group of activists to organise is one of the main reasons why the Free Burma Campaign (FBC) boycott of goods made in Burma has proved so effective (see below).

`Electronic Direct Action'

For a minority of activists, the Internet provides scope for various forms of `electronic direct action'--the electronic equivalent of sit-ins and graffiti-writing. A common method is to send a flood of e-mail messages--in some cases from pre-programmed computers--in the hope of causing the recipient's computer to crash.

One group that specialises in this approach is the so-called Electronic Disturbance Theater, which originated as a us-based support group for Zapatista rebels in Mexico (who have their own website; www.ezln.org). Recent targets for the theatre's software attacks have included Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo and the us Defense Department (Harmon 1998). Stefan Wray, one of its founders, says that he sees such tactics as `a form of electronic civil disobedience ... transferring the social-movement tactics of trespass and blockade to the Internet'. He seeks to rally like-minded activists with the slogan, `The revolution will be digitalized!'

Other groups have broken into their targets' websites to add their own messages. In June 1998, shortly after India's nuclear explosion, British and Dutch students claimed credit for breaking into the website of India's major nuclear centre and imposing the image of mushroom-shaped cloud. A few months later, activists broke into an Indian government website promoting tourism in Kashmir; they wrote, `Save Kashmir' on the opening screen, and included pictures of alleged victims of the Indian army's Kashmir counter-insurgency campaign (Harmon 1998). Companies are potentially at risk from the same sort of direct action.

Company Responses

In early 1998, a report by Fletcher Research, a specialist British management consultancy, commented that companies tended to `miss the point' of the Internet (Kuper and Mackintosh 1998). Many simply post annual reports and other standard printed material on the Web, without making any attempt to modify the design for a different medium or a wider audience. In particular, they often ignore the Web's interactive qualities, which make it possible to receive messages as well as transmit them. This `collective lack of imagination' has resulted in lost commercial opportunities.

Similar criticisms have applied to companies' responses to NGO debates, at least initially. Rather than taking the initiative to put forward their points of view, companies have either ignored controversial issues on their websites, or reacted defensively. As a result, they may come across as remote, uncaring and--in some cases--arrogant. It is only relatively recently that companies have begun to adopt a more sophisticated approach, acknowledging different points of view and using the Internet as a means of soliciting opinions rather than simply conveying counter-propaganda.

Freeport McMoRan

Freeport McMoRan, the us-based mining company, uses its website (www.fcx.com) to defend itself from criticism concerning its mine at Grasberg in the Indonesian province of Irian Jaya (also known as `West Papua'). The mine is one of the world's largest, and it is sited in a previously remote highland region with little previous economic development. The project has attracted fierce criticism from groups such as the UK's World Development Movement (WDM), both on account of the environmental repercussions and the social impact on indigenous peoples.

Freeport's website acknowledges the complexities of Grasberg's problems, and it includes an extract from an independent social audit report calling for the company to demonstrate greater `vision and drive in social and cultural development'. However, the overall tone is uncompromising. People who disagree with Freeport's position are dismissed as `anti-mining activists', a designation that apparently leaves little room for honest disagreement.

Monsanto

Monsanto, the us-based pharmaceutical company, adopts contrasting approaches in its US and UK websites, and these reflect differences in the political and social environment in the two countries although--of course--both sites can be viewed worldwide.

Over the last ten years, Monsanto has embarked on a billion-dollar research programme to develop genetically modified crops, including a new variety of maize which is resistant to corn borer insects, us consumers appear ready to trust companies to undertake biotechnological experiments. In contrast, in Europe, consumers have been sensitised by problems such as the UK's `mad cow disease' (BSE) affair, which suggest that `interference with nature' can have dire results. Greenpeace and other NGOs have conducted a high-profile campaign against the company's plans.

The website of the us parent company (www.monsanto.com) discusses the company's bio-technological innovations, boldly asserting that it will help feed the world's expanding population. However, there is no substantive discussion of the potential risks. Similarly, the website of the South African subsidiary (www.monsanto.co.za) it is clearly addressed to farmers rather than consumers: `Now you have the opportunity to make your corn production more profitable over the long run ...'. The text says that turtles `carry complete protection against natural enemies' throughout their lives, and argues that maize deserves the same privilege. To underline the point, the text concludes with a picture of a small turtle cheerfully waving its head. The site includes a section entitled `Social Responsibilities', but this refers to corporate good works, such as school sponsorship, rather than the impact of its own products.

The website of Monsanto's UK subsidiary (www.monsanto.co.uk) is much more forthright in acknowledging alternative points of view. It affirms the company's own position, which is that the new technology is socially beneficial as well as financially profitable, but it also explains that many disagree. Food is important, and readers have a right to know all the arguments, so the website helpfully provides links to critics such as Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and the `Iceland' supermarket chain (whose proprietor opposes genetically modified foods). The tone of its website suggests that the company has learned to treat its critics with respect while still hoping to win the long-term argument and--most importantly--the approval of consumers. This may prove to be a long battle.

Royal Dutch Shell

Royal Dutch Shell's website (www.shell.com) is highly sophisticated, both in the style of its presentation and in its contents. The website repeatedly stresses the company's willingness to listen and respond to contrary points of view from NGOs and individuals.

This approach is a considered response to past controversies. In 1995, Shell was embroiled in a vigorous Greenpeace campaign on account of its plans to dispose of the Brent Spar offshore platform by sinking it at sea. In November 1995, human rights activists accused the company of collusion with the Nigerian regime following the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa, a dissident leader from the oil-producing region of Ogoniland. These two events prompted the company to review the way it operated. Shell Group Managing Director Cor Herkstroter acknowledged that the company might have been `excessively focused on internal matters' (Herkstroter 1996). As a result, it had proved sensitive to changing attitudes outside the company--and the Brent Spar and Ogoniland controversies caught it by surprise. The company's website is designed both to express the company's point of view to the outside world, and to provide an early warning system of similar controversies in the future.

Shell's General Business Principles are published on its website. These include commitments to contribute to sustainable development, and to `express support for human rights in line with the legitimate role of business'. However, the company acknowledges that putting these principles into practice may not be straightforward. Under the heading `Issues and Dilemmas', the company lists six problem areas: dealing with industrial legacies; renewables; sustainable development; human rights; globalisation and the role of multinationals; and operating in politically sensitive regions. Under each heading, the company includes a space for readers to type their own views, and a `Shell Ballot Box' where readers are invited to register their views on questions such as: `Should business use their influence with government to address broader issues of human rights?'

To judge by the number of people responding, the site has been a success. Between 1996 and 1998 it attracted nearly six million visitors, and received nearly 26,000 e-mails. In November 1998, Shell launched a new, completely redesigned website and it promised that this would evolve continuously with the help of feedback from readers. Information on public opinion gathered via the Internet contributes to company policy-making. However, consultation via the Internet is not a panacea. Shell rightly emphasises that international companies face dilemmas to which there may be no consensus answers.

Internet Activism for Human Rights and Sustainable Development in Burma

The international controversy over the future of Burma illustrates how companies may be caught up in wider international debates where there are no obvious solutions. In the last ten years, Burma has emerged as a cause celebre among human rights activists because of its history of political repression. Between the 1960s and the late 1980s, the country adopted an isolationist policy, preferring to develop an indigenous `Burmese Path to Socialism'. During that period, internal political developments were scarcely reported in the outside world. In contrast, in the 1990s, Burma's internal affairs have been vigorously debated abroad, and the Internet has played a key role in facilitating the debate.

The international debate has focused on Burma's poor record on civil and political rights, but it is impossible to separate this from other issues, such as environmental management and the prospects for equitable economic development. Burma's military leaders argue that an authoritarian government is well placed to take the tough decisions that are needed to accelerate the country's economic expansion. In contrast, the regime's opponents point out that a regime that lacks democratic accountability is more likely to serve the interests of a narrow group of supporters--in this case the army and its commercial allies--rather than the country as a whole. Many of the government's decisions--for example, the granting of logging permits to Thai companies in the early 1990s--have been associated with severe environmental damage.

Western businesspeople working in Burma typically acknowledge the country's many problems, but argue that their own companies operate to the highest labour and environmental standards. As this case study will show, NGO critics insist that this view of corporate social responsibility is far too narrow. (For a discussion of the links between environmental management and broader issues of corporate social responsibility, see Bendell's Editorial in this issue, pp. 3-9.)

International Policy Dilemmas

It is almost universally agreed that the present state of affairs in Burma is unsatisfactory. The military regime has been widely condemned for its refusal to enter into dialogue with the main opposition party, Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD). The NLD won a two-thirds majority in the 1990 national elections, but the new parliament was never allowed to convene. Aung San Suu Kyi's movements remain restricted, and many of her followers are in prison.

Every year since 1991, the UN General Assembly has passed consensus motions condemning the country's human rights record, but there is no international consensus on the best means of influencing the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC; previously known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council). Governments, companies and NGOs each face their own variations on a common set of dilemmas:

* Governments have to decide whether confrontation or `constructive engagement' is more likely to promote reform. The us government has opted for confrontation by implementing unilateral sanctions on new investment in 1997. The Asian countries--particularly ASEAN--have favoured constructive engagement (Bray 1995).

* Companies--and their critics--have had to grapple with similar questions: would investment and trade help support a pariah regime? Or would increasing commercial contact with the outside world help to promote reform? To what extent would companies' presence in the country be associated--directly or indirectly--with human rights abuses such as the government's use of forced labour to build roads or railways?

* Development NGOs have been involved in a similar debate. There is no doubt of the need for development assistance, but NGOs have had to ask to what extent they can operate independently in Burma. Does their presence help support the regime? Or does overwhelming human need override all other considerations?

Opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi has consistently favoured international confrontation with SLORC/SPDC rather than `constructive engagement' and has called on investors to avoid Burma as long as the present regime is in power. As a Nobel Peace Prize winner, she has immense moral authority, and Burma human rights campaigners across the world have tended to follow her line.

The Role of the Internet in the Burma Debate

A source of information. The Internet has provided a rich source--or rather a set of sources--of information. The BurmaNet news group sends daily bulletins of news free of charge to subscribers. These mainly consist of articles from the international press--particularly from Thailand--with occasional editorial comment. It also includes reports from NGOs working with Burmese refugees in Thailand. BurmaNet is run from Bangkok by an enthusiast who operates under the pseudonym `Strider'.

Meanwhile, NGOs, governments and companies each discuss current Burmese affairs on their websites.

* Notable Burma human rights campaign groups include the US-based Free Burma Campaign (www.sunsite.unc.edu/ freeburma/index.html).

* The Burmese government has responded by creating its own website (www.myanmar.com). This includes extracts from the official newspaper, The New Light of Myanmar.

* International companies operating in Burma discuss their activities on their own sites. The quality of the information they provide varies enormously. The US petroleum company Unocal (www.unocal.com.myanmar) discusses the progress of its project, and ancillary social development schemes, in some detail. However, Premier Oil (UK) has only just recognised the need to have a website at all. The website (www.premier-oil.com) contains only the scantiest references to Burma.

There are still significant gaps. Burma remains a closed society. Diplomats in Rangoon complain that they are forced to rely on rumour rather than more reliable sources of information on a notoriously secretive regime. Reliable information on areas outside the capital is scarce. The Internet is not available within Burma except to a handful of privileged international agencies.

A campaign tool. The Free Burma Campaign (FBC) in America is a powerful example of a pressure group's use of the Internet. In the early stages, the leading figure was Zarni, a Burmese PhD student at the University of Wisconsin (he has now received his doctorate), who was said to spend some 15 hours a day in front of his computer. The FBC argues that Burma is the `South Africa of the 1990s'. Using the Internet, the FBC has been able to co-ordinate more than 120 local support groups in schools and colleges across the us. It also works with like-minded groups internationally. Its British counterpart is the Burma Campaign (formerly the Burma Action Group).

The FBC's strategy has been first to call on consumers to boycott the goods of companies operating in Burma. Secondly, it has pressed us city and state administrations to introduce `selective purchasing legislation', whereby they would refuse to do business with companies operating in Burma. The state of Massachusetts has introduced such legislation, as have a dozen cities including Berkeley (California) and San Francisco.

The Impact on Business

These campaigns have affected companies in different ways, and the precise impact depends in part both on the industry and on the country of origin.

Consumer goods. Producers of consumer goods are most vulnerable to boycott campaigns, and the Internet has made these campaigns all the more effective. A succession of clothing companies have withdrawn contact with suppliers based in Burma. The first such company was Levi Strauss in 1992 and it has been followed by a series of others, including Liz Claiborne, Macy's department store and British Home Stores.

Similarly, Heineken and Carlsberg withdrew from Burma in 1996, followed by Pepsi in 1997. Shortly before Pepsi announced its withdrawal, it lost a $1 million contract with Harvard University as a direct result of the FBC campaign.

Tourism. The Burmese authorities declared 1996/97 to be `Visit Myanmar Year', but have had much less success in attracting foreign tourists than they had hoped. The new international-style hotels which have been built in Rangoon since the early 1990s are said to be running with occupancy rates of 15%-20%. Burma support groups in the West have been calling for a boycott on tourism in Burma, and the Internet apparently helped them get their message across.

Oil and gas. The impact on the companies engaged in offshore gas exploration has been more mixed. There are two principal offshore gas projects. Total (France) is the lead operator in the Yadana field and works in a joint venture between Unocal (US), the Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT) and the state-owned Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE). In 1997 Premier (UK) replaced Texaco (US) as the lead operator in the Yetagun field in association with PTT, Petronas (Malaysia) and Nippon Oil (Japan).

From a human rights point of view, the petroleum companies' presence is particularly sensitive. First, the gas will ultimately provide one of the main sources of income to the government. Secondly, the main export pipeline runs through an area that has suffered from a long-running insurgency involving the Mon and Karen ethnic minorities. The operating companies ultimately depend on the protection of the Burmese army, which is not renowned for its adherence to human rights principles. Thirdly, the government has reportedly used forced labour to help construct a railway line running south from the town of Ye towards the pipeline terminus. The companies have denied that the railway line is linked to their project, or that they will benefit from it, but many of their critics have been reluctant to accept this. A fourth concern voiced by NGOs is the environmental impact on forests on both sides of the Burma-Thailand border.

Texaco's decision in 1997 to sell its share in the Yetagun field was ostensibly based on a commercial judgement. However, it is widely believed that the us government's decision to impose sanctions on new investment in Burma exercised a significant influence, even though Texaco--as an existing investor--was exempt from the sanctions.

The other petroleum companies have proved more robust. This is partly because of the nature of their investments. Investments in the oil sector are much larger and demand a longer lead time than investments in the clothing or drinks sectors. Additional factors may include the fact that Unocal scaled down its downstream activities in the us, and to that extent is less exposed to consumer boycotts. Total is less exposed to consumer pressure in France than Unocal is in the us because the Burma human rights campaign movement is less developed there. Similar considerations apply to the partners in the Yetagun field. Premier does not have significant downstream operations, while neither Petronas nor Nippon Oil face major Burma campaigns in their own countries.

However, while the international partners in the Yadana and Yetagun fields are determined to continue their operations, they are nonetheless sensitive to the impact of Burma human rights campaigners on their reputations. Alongside their main commercial activities, they have helped fund development projects in the pipeline area and, in Premier's case, in Rangoon and the Inle Lake region. Some of these projects are described on the Unocal websites and provide evidence to support the companies' argument that their presence in Burma benefits the wider population and not just the ruling elite. The debate continues--both on the Internet and in other media.

Implications for the Wider Human Rights Debate

The Burma case study shows that the impact of NGO pressure--with or without the Internet--varies according to the industry in which specific companies operate, and their country of origin. Companies producing consumer goods are more susceptible to pressure than those in the petroleum sector. Petroleum companies are more susceptible if they have significant downstream operations, and in particular if they operate in the US.

The Burma case study also points to two broader issues:

* First, when is `engagement' with an outcast regime `constructive'? To many Burma human rights activists, `constructive engagement' has been synonymous with `appeasement'. However, as noted above, some development NGOs as well as companies have decided that the benefits of operating within the present system in Burma outweigh the disadvantages. From a human rights point of view, what forms of `engagement' are constructive? And in what circumstances?

* More importantly, who decides? Both Japan and the European Union have denounced Massachusetts's selective purchasing legislation discriminating against companies operating in Burma. Critics have suggested that Massachusetts is--in effect--conducting its own foreign policy. Is this legitimate? Are mere state legislators qualified to judge complex international issues?

However, critics of Massachusetts's `foreign policy' may be missing the point. In the future, a Western company's human rights standards will be judged not so much by governments--whether national or regional--as by ordinary consumers. The Internet will play an important role in shaping their views.

The Campaign Against the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI)

NGOs affect companies directly, when their campaigns focus specifically on the companies' own activities, as well as indirectly when they lobby governments on proposed new legislation or international treaties. The successful NGO campaign against the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) provides a particularly powerful example of the influence on both government and business of the new online civil society. The MAI is--or was--a draft international treaty drawn up by the 29 member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Negotiations began in May 1995, and at first attracted little publicity outside a narrow circle of specialists. However, in early 1997 the draft Mat came to the attention of advocacy groups in North America and Western Europe. They argued that the treaty would give too much power to transnational corporations--not least because it would undermine governments' rights to regulate the environment within their own jurisdictions.

The NGOs used the Internet to co-ordinate an anti-MAI campaign involving several hundred groups across the world. Largely as a result, the OECD's discussions on the MAI were suspended in April 1998, and there is no immediate prospect of a resumption. This case study therefore illustrates both the role of the Internet in facilitating such campaigns, and the wider debate about the role of transnational corporations in the global economy.

The Case for the MAI

The MAI was intended to establish a liberalised framework for international investment, complementing the work of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) on trade matters. The OECD points out that international investment has made a major contribution to economic growth, particularly in the last 50 years, and is an `essential agent of economic growth, employment, sustainable development and rising living standards' (OECD 1998a). However, the multilateral system lacks a comprehensive and coherent framework of `rules of the game' for investment. The MAI therefore aimed to provide:

a level playing-field with uniform rules on both market access and legal security. It aims at eliminating harriers and distortions to investment flows, promoting a more efficient allocation of economic resources and thereby achieving higher economic growth, more jobs and increased living standards (OECD 1998a).

The agreement was to include disciplines in three key areas: investment protection, investment liberalisation, and binding dispute resolution. The core concept of the MAI was non-discrimination: government signatories were to commit themselves to treatment of foreign investors and their investments `no less favourably than they treat their own investors' (Drohan 1998).

The agreement was to be a freestanding international treaty open both to OECD members and to non-member states. Signatories were to commit themselves to its terms for a minimum of five years. Even if they subsequently decided to withdraw from the agreement, foreign investors who had entered a host country while the MAI was in force would continue to enjoy its privileges for a minimum of 15 years.

The Campaign against the MAI

The most striking aspect of the NGO campaign against the Mat was its international reach. This would have been impossible without the Internet. As the chair of the NGO Council of Canadians commented:

We are in constant contact with our allies in other countries. If a negotiator says something to someone over a glass of wine, we'll have it on the Internet within an hour, all over the world (Drohan 1998).

In early 1998, the Council of Canadians used the Internet to publish a joint statement on the agreement which was endorsed by 560 organisations in 67 countries (www.canadians.org/ngostatement.html). These ranged from the national branches of major `multinational' NGOs such as Friends of the Earth (FOE) to much smaller organisations such as the Area Clamdiggers Association (Canada), Green Osijek (Croatia) and the Tartu Student Nature Protection Group (Estonia). The signatories criticised both the way that negotiations had been conducted, and the substance of the draft agreement.

First, they argued that the OECD was not an appropriate forum within which to discuss a treaty with global ramifications. The OECD, which is often described as a `rich man's club', represents industrialised rather than developing economies. However, the overwhelming majority of transnational companies are based in the OECD. If developing countries wanted to retain access to international investment, they would face intense pressure to sign the MAI without having been involved in the negotiations.

Secondly, the NGOs accused the OECD of conducting the negotiations in a secretive manner, to the extent that many government ministers were poorly informed of its implications, even in OECD member states. Lori M. Wallach of the Washington-based Public Citizen Group compared the MAI with Dracula: it would not stand up to public scrutiny of the `light of day' (Wallach 1998).

Turning to the substance of the treaty, the NGOs pointed out that the MAI was wholly unbalanced: it concentrated in the rights of investors and not on their obligations. In particular, it did not devote adequate attention to environmental safeguards. They argued that companies could use the treaty to override government environmental regulations initiatives, such as the governmental promotion of local production and trade. Moreover, citizens, indigenous peoples, local governments and NGOs would not have access to the dispute resolution system established by the MAI, and therefore could not hold international companies accountable for their operations (www.canadians.org/NGOstatement.html).

The NGOs scored points in the MAI debate by the way in which their arguments were presented, as well as the arguments themselves. The OECD has now set up its own Mil website (within www.oecd.org), but this comes across as staid and colourless by contrast with the NGOs' counterblasts.

The initial OECD reaction to the NGOs has been bemusement and even bewilderment (Jonquieres 1998). The NGOs have clearly demonstrated their collective power, but in official circles there is little understanding of their motives and methods.

At a meeting in Paris on 22 October 1998, senior representatives of OECD member countries reaffirmed the need for and value of a multilateral framework of rules for investment. However, they also acknowledged the concerns that had been raised about issues of sovereignty and safeguards for the environment and labour rights. They therefore recognised that there was a need for further discussions with representatives of civil society, including NGOs (OECD 1998b). In early December, there was an OECD meeting with representatives of trade unions and NGOs: there was a useful exchange of views but no specific outcome. The issues still remain on the international agenda, but there is no clear programme to find a means of addressing them.

Beyond the Web War of Words?

From the NGOs' point of view, the MAI affair vividly demonstrates the negative implications of globalisation--the growing power of transnational corporations with different views on sustainable development--but it also points to some positive aspects. New communications technology has made it possible for like-minded groups of activists to co-ordinate their activities internationally in a way which previously would never have been possible. Greater public access to information via the Internet has helped changed the balance of power between companies, NGOs and consumers. In an Internet-connected world, companies are coming to realise that there is no hiding place for poor performance on environmental and social issues. Today's business leaders are having to discuss complex issues of sustainable development and corporate responsibility much more openly than in the past.

However, criticism from NGOs and defensiveness from business will not be enough to achieve the much-cited goal of sustainable development, or consensus on human rights and other controversies. Both the Burma and the MAI campaigns have been essentially `negative', in the sense that they have sought to prevent companies and governments from pursuing particular policies, rather than seeking to identify solutions to complex problems.

There are significant cultural obstacles on both sides. All too often, senior business and government leaders have tended to dismiss NGO critics as ill-informed trouble-makers. The NGOs have responded with counterblasts that tend to caricature big business, rather than seeking a more nuanced understanding of the way decisions are made.

The Internet will not solve these problems, but it does offer a tool that can be used for constructive debate, as well as polemic. A recent example is an Internet discussion group for practitioners and researchers interested in business--NGO relations and responsible enterprise, hosted by the Mailbase server of Newcastle University in the UK (www.mailbase.ac.uk/lists/business-ngo-relations). Some companies, such as Shell, have shown how to move beyond a Web-driven war of words and harness the Internet as a tool to promote discussion rather than suppress it--and to learn from the results. It is a lesson that needs to be much more widely learned--by governments as well as companies.

(*) This paper develops ideas from an earlier article, `Web of Influence', The World Today 53.8-9 (August 1997), and a presentation on `The Role of the Internet' at a conference on Multinational Investment and Human Rights (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 20 April 1998)

(1.) These issues are discussed in greater detail in Control Risks Group 1997.

(2.) Subscription details are posted on www.snowlion.com

References

Bray, John (1995) Burma: The Politics of Constructive Engagement (Discussion Paper, 58; London: Royal Institute of International Affairs).

Control Risks Group (1997) No Hiding Place: Business and the Politics of Pressure (London: Control Risks Group).

De Jonquieres, Guy (1998) `Network Guerrillas', Financial Times, 30 April 1998.

Drohan, Madelaine (1998) `How the Net Killed the MAI: Grassroots groups used their own globalization to derail deal', The Globe and Mail, 29 April 1998; cited on the Corporate Watch website, www.corpwatch.org/trac/corner/ worldnews/other137.html.

Harmon, Amy (1998) `Hactivists of all persuasions take their struggle to the Web', New York Times, 31 October 1998.

Herkstroter, C.A.J. (1996) `Dealing with Contradictory Expectations: The Dilemmas Facing Multinationals' (speech by the President of Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, The Hague, 11 October 1996).

Independent (1998) `Electronic Warfare', The Independent, 10 December 1998: Education Section.

Kuper, Simon, and James Mackintosh (1998) `Big companies "miss point" of interest', Financial Times, 26 January 1998.

OECD (1998a) `The Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Frequently Asked Questions and Answers', www.oecd.org.

OECD (1998b) `Multilateral Framework for Investment', www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/ mai/maindex.htm, updated 23 October 1998.

Understanding Global Issues (1997) `Multinational Business: Beyond Government Control', Understanding Global Issues 97/11 (Special Issue).

Wallach, Lori M. (1998) A Dangerous New Manifesto for Global Capitalism', Le monde diplomatique, February 1998; English text available at www.mondediplomatique.fr/en/1998/02/07 mai.html.

John Bray Control Risks Group, London, UK

John Bray is Principal Research Consultant of Control Risks Group, the London-based business risk consultancy. He is the principal author of No Hiding Place: Business and the Politics of Pressure (Control Risks Group, 1997). His current research interests include the politics of corruption, and the contemporary politics of South and South-East Asia.3