Beware of Sulking Warlords in This Rearranged Afghanistan
Husain Haqqani . IHT . 24 december 2001

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan If recent history is any guide, the people of Afghanistan find it easier to reach agreements than to carry them out. The agreement that led to installation of an interim government in Kabul on Saturday, backed by the United Nations, is a diplomatic compromise that does not appear to take into account the aspirations of the warlords who hold real authority.
.
Hopes are being pinned on the prospect of international economic assistance and involvement of the world's major powers. But the capacity of Afghan warlords to undermine any deal should not be underestimated. Afghans have been at war for more than 20 years, first against the occupation by the Soviet Union and then among themselves. As a result, traditional institutions collapsed and new ones have not sufficiently taken hold. Demographics have been altered by emigration and the mass exodus of refugees. The old elite - royalists and intellectuals in exile - cannot relate to the new realities on the ground.
.
Previously ignored ethnic groups, such as the Shiite Hazaras, have gained power on the strength of having well-armed militias. The Uzbeks of the northwest, previously restricted to their home provinces, now seek a share in power in Kabul. Influential Pashtun tribal leaders of the past have lost ground to younger commanders. Docile mullahs have given way to aggressive mujahidin, while the Taliban regime empowered semi-literate peasants against their urbanized compatriots.
.
Diplomats usually find it easier to deal with diplomats, which gives English-speaking Afghans living in exile an advantage over unsophisticated military commanders during negotiations.
.
In 1992, when the first of several Afghan peace accords was signed in Peshawar, Sibghatullah Mujaddidi was appointed head of a six-month interim council. Within hours of the signing of the latest UN-brokered deal in Bonn, he predicted its failure. Six months is too short a time for an interim administration, he said.
.
The new consensus leader, Hamid Karzai, a respected Afghan patriot, has the unique advantage of being acceptable to the English-speaking diplomats and yet having a presence inside Afghanistan. He is a royalist without being a royal. If he seeks to extend the six-month tenure of his interim regime, he will face opposition from others who have deliberately kept the term short for their own personal or group advantage. The most serious opposition to the Bonn agreement has come from the same elements that led Afghanistan into the fratricidal civil war 10 years ago.
.
The Uzbek warlord Abdur Rashid Dostum, freshly armed and financed by the United States, is threatening to boycott the new Kabul government if he is not given the share in power that he demands.
.
The predominantly Pashtun Hezb-i-Islami, once led by Gulbeddin Hekmatyar but now divided into several factions, is also unhappy with its exclusion. Mr. Hekmatyar is best known for raining rockets on Kabul when, after being appointed Prime Minister in the early 1990s, he was denied entry into the capital by the troops of the late Ahmed Shah Massoud.
.
A hard-line Afghan theologian, Abdurrab Rasul Sayyaf, the only significant Pashtun leader in the Northern Alliance, wanted the Interior Ministry and is unhappy that he has not received it.
.
Leaders of the Hazara Hizb-i-Wahdat feel neglected in the power-sharing arrangement.
.
Add to the list of disgruntled leaders the names of Burhanuddin Rabbani, who loses the presidency, and Pir Syed Ahmed Gilani, head of the moderate Pashtun exiles based in Pakistan.
.
Most Afghan objections to the UN-sponsored agreement are based on the undue influence of the three younger Northern Alliance leaders, Interior Minister Yunus Qanuni, Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah and Defense Minister Mohammed Fahim. All three are ethnic Tajiks from the sparsely populated Panjshir Valley. Critics wonder at the representative character of an interim regime that gives key portfolios and virtual control of government to a closely knit cabal from a single village.
.
For the moment, the heavy U.S. military presence in search of Osama bin Laden and his Qaida terrorist network has muted such objections.
.
The writer, a former Pakistani diplomat and journalist, served as an adviser to Prime Ministers Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto. He contributed this comment to the International Herald Tribune. ISLAMABAD, Pakistan If recent history is any guide, the people of Afghanistan find it easier to reach agreements than to carry them out. The agreement that led to installation of an interim government in Kabul on Saturday, backed by the United Nations, is a diplomatic compromise that does not appear to take into account the aspirations of the warlords who hold real authority.
.
Hopes are being pinned on the prospect of international economic assistance and involvement of the world's major powers. But the capacity of Afghan warlords to undermine any deal should not be underestimated. Afghans have been at war for more than 20 years, first against the occupation by the Soviet Union and then among themselves. As a result, traditional institutions collapsed and new ones have not sufficiently taken hold. Demographics have been altered by emigration and the mass exodus of refugees. The old elite - royalists and intellectuals in exile - cannot relate to the new realities on the ground.
.
Previously ignored ethnic groups, such as the Shiite Hazaras, have gained power on the strength of having well-armed militias. The Uzbeks of the northwest, previously restricted to their home provinces, now seek a share in power in Kabul. Influential Pashtun tribal leaders of the past have lost ground to younger commanders. Docile mullahs have given way to aggressive mujahidin, while the Taliban regime empowered semi-literate peasants against their urbanized compatriots.
.
Diplomats usually find it easier to deal with diplomats, which gives English-speaking Afghans living in exile an advantage over unsophisticated military commanders during negotiations.
.
In 1992, when the first of several Afghan peace accords was signed in Peshawar, Sibghatullah Mujaddidi was appointed head of a six-month interim council. Within hours of the signing of the latest UN-brokered deal in Bonn, he predicted its failure. Six months is too short a time for an interim administration, he said.
.
The new consensus leader, Hamid Karzai, a respected Afghan patriot, has the unique advantage of being acceptable to the English-speaking diplomats and yet having a presence inside Afghanistan. He is a royalist without being a royal. If he seeks to extend the six-month tenure of his interim regime, he will face opposition from others who have deliberately kept the term short for their own personal or group advantage. The most serious opposition to the Bonn agreement has come from the same elements that led Afghanistan into the fratricidal civil war 10 years ago.
.
The Uzbek warlord Abdur Rashid Dostum, freshly armed and financed by the United States, is threatening to boycott the new Kabul government if he is not given the share in power that he demands.
.
The predominantly Pashtun Hezb-i-Islami, once led by Gulbeddin Hekmatyar but now divided into several factions, is also unhappy with its exclusion. Mr. Hekmatyar is best known for raining rockets on Kabul when, after being appointed Prime Minister in the early 1990s, he was denied entry into the capital by the troops of the late Ahmed Shah Massoud.
.
A hard-line Afghan theologian, Abdurrab Rasul Sayyaf, the only significant Pashtun leader in the Northern Alliance, wanted the Interior Ministry and is unhappy that he has not received it.
.
Leaders of the Hazara Hizb-i-Wahdat feel neglected in the power-sharing arrangement.
.
Add to the list of disgruntled leaders the names of Burhanuddin Rabbani, who loses the presidency, and Pir Syed Ahmed Gilani, head of the moderate Pashtun exiles based in Pakistan.
.
Most Afghan objections to the UN-sponsored agreement are based on the undue influence of the three younger Northern Alliance leaders, Interior Minister Yunus Qanuni, Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah and Defense Minister Mohammed Fahim. All three are ethnic Tajiks from the sparsely populated Panjshir Valley. Critics wonder at the representative character of an interim regime that gives key portfolios and virtual control of government to a closely knit cabal from a single village.
.
For the moment, the heavy U.S. military presence in search of Osama bin Laden and his Qaida terrorist network has muted such objections.
.
The writer, a former Pakistani diplomat and journalist, served as an adviser to Prime Ministers Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto. He contributed this comment to the International Herald Tribune. ISLAMABAD, Pakistan If recent history is any guide, the people of Afghanistan find it easier to reach agreements than to carry them out. The agreement that led to installation of an interim government in Kabul on Saturday, backed by the United Nations, is a diplomatic compromise that does not appear to take into account the aspirations of the warlords who hold real authority.
.
Hopes are being pinned on the prospect of international economic assistance and involvement of the world's major powers. But the capacity of Afghan warlords to undermine any deal should not be underestimated. Afghans have been at war for more than 20 years, first against the occupation by the Soviet Union and then among themselves. As a result, traditional institutions collapsed and new ones have not sufficiently taken hold. Demographics have been altered by emigration and the mass exodus of refugees. The old elite - royalists and intellectuals in exile - cannot relate to the new realities on the ground.
.
Previously ignored ethnic groups, such as the Shiite Hazaras, have gained power on the strength of having well-armed militias. The Uzbeks of the northwest, previously restricted to their home provinces, now seek a share in power in Kabul. Influential Pashtun tribal leaders of the past have lost ground to younger commanders. Docile mullahs have given way to aggressive mujahidin, while the Taliban regime empowered semi-literate peasants against their urbanized compatriots.
.
Diplomats usually find it easier to deal with diplomats, which gives English-speaking Afghans living in exile an advantage over unsophisticated military commanders during negotiations.
.
In 1992, when the first of several Afghan peace accords was signed in Peshawar, Sibghatullah Mujaddidi was appointed head of a six-month interim council. Within hours of the signing of the latest UN-brokered deal in Bonn, he predicted its failure. Six months is too short a time for an interim administration, he said

The new consensus leader, Hamid Karzai, a respected Afghan patriot, has the unique advantage of being acceptable to the English-speaking diplomats and yet having a presence inside Afghanistan. He is a royalist without being a royal. If he seeks to extend the six-month tenure of his interim regime, he will face opposition from others who have deliberately kept the term short for their own personal or group advantage. The most serious opposition to the Bonn agreement has come from the same elements that led Afghanistan into the fratricidal civil war 10 years ago.
.
The Uzbek warlord Abdur Rashid Dostum, freshly armed and financed by the United States, is threatening to boycott the new Kabul government if he is not given the share in power that he demands.
.
The predominantly Pashtun Hezb-i-Islami, once led by Gulbeddin Hekmatyar but now divided into several factions, is also unhappy with its exclusion. Mr. Hekmatyar is best known for raining rockets on Kabul when, after being appointed Prime Minister in the early 1990s, he was denied entry into the capital by the troops of the late Ahmed Shah Massoud.
.
A hard-line Afghan theologian, Abdurrab Rasul Sayyaf, the only significant Pashtun leader in the Northern Alliance, wanted the Interior Ministry and is unhappy that he has not received it.
.
Leaders of the Hazara Hizb-i-Wahdat feel neglected in the power-sharing arrangement.
.
Add to the list of disgruntled leaders the names of Burhanuddin Rabbani, who loses the presidency, and Pir Syed Ahmed Gilani, head of the moderate Pashtun exiles based in Pakistan.
.
Most Afghan objections to the UN-sponsored agreement are based on the undue influence of the three younger Northern Alliance leaders, Interior Minister Yunus Qanuni, Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah and Defense Minister Mohammed Fahim. All three are ethnic Tajiks from the sparsely populated Panjshir Valley. Critics wonder at the representative character of an interim regime that gives key portfolios and virtual control of government to a closely knit cabal from a single village.
.
For the moment, the heavy U.S. military presence in search of Osama bin Laden and his Qaida terrorist network has muted such objections.
.
The writer, a former Pakistani diplomat and journalist, served as an adviser to Prime Ministers Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto. He contributed this comment to the International Herald Tribune. ISLAMABAD, Pakistan If recent history is any guide, the people of Afghanistan find it easier to reach agreements than to carry them out. The agreement that led to installation of an interim government in Kabul on Saturday, backed by the United Nations, is a diplomatic compromise that does not appear to take into account the aspirations of the warlords who hold real authority.
.
Hopes are being pinned on the prospect of international economic assistance and involvement of the world's major powers. But the capacity of Afghan warlords to undermine any deal should not be underestimated. Afghans have been at war for more than 20 years, first against the occupation by the Soviet Union and then among themselves. As a result, traditional institutions collapsed and new ones have not sufficiently taken hold. Demographics have been altered by emigration and the mass exodus of refugees. The old elite - royalists and intellectuals in exile - cannot relate to the new realities on the ground.
.
Previously ignored ethnic groups, such as the Shiite Hazaras, have gained power on the strength of having well-armed militias. The Uzbeks of the northwest, previously restricted to their home provinces, now seek a share in power in Kabul. Influential Pashtun tribal leaders of the past have lost ground to younger commanders. Docile mullahs have given way to aggressive mujahidin, while the Taliban regime empowered semi-literate peasants against their urbanized compatriots.
.
Diplomats usually find it easier to deal with diplomats, which gives English-speaking Afghans living in exile an advantage over unsophisticated military commanders during negotiations.
.
In 1992, when the first of several Afghan peace accords was signed in Peshawar, Sibghatullah Mujaddidi was appointed head of a six-month interim council. Within hours of the signing of the latest UN-brokered deal in Bonn, he predicted its failure. Six months is too short a time for an interim administration, he said.
.
The new consensus leader, Hamid Karzai, a respected Afghan patriot, has the unique advantage of being acceptable to the English-speaking diplomats and yet having a presence inside Afghanistan. He is a royalist without being a royal. If he seeks to extend the six-month tenure of his interim regime, he will face opposition from others who have deliberately kept the term short for their own personal or group advantage. The most serious opposition to the Bonn agreement has come from the same elements that led Afghanistan into the fratricidal civil war 10 years ago.
.
The Uzbek warlord Abdur Rashid Dostum, freshly armed and financed by the United States, is threatening to boycott the new Kabul government if he is not given the share in power that he demands.
.
The predominantly Pashtun Hezb-i-Islami, once led by Gulbeddin Hekmatyar but now divided into several factions, is also unhappy with its exclusion. Mr. Hekmatyar is best known for raining rockets on Kabul when, after being appointed Prime Minister in the early 1990s, he was denied entry into the capital by the troops of the late Ahmed Shah Massoud.
.
A hard-line Afghan theologian, Abdurrab Rasul Sayyaf, the only significant Pashtun leader in the Northern Alliance, wanted the Interior Ministry and is unhappy that he has not received it.
.
Leaders of the Hazara Hizb-i-Wahdat feel neglected in the power-sharing arrangement.
.
Add to the list of disgruntled leaders the names of Burhanuddin Rabbani, who loses the presidency, and Pir Syed Ahmed Gilani, head of the moderate Pashtun exiles based in Pakistan.
.
Most Afghan objections to the UN-sponsored agreement are based on the undue influence of the three younger Northern Alliance leaders, Interior Minister Yunus Qanuni, Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah and Defense Minister Mohammed Fahim. All three are ethnic Tajiks from the sparsely populated Panjshir Valley. Critics wonder at the representative character of an interim regime that gives key portfolios and virtual control of government to a closely knit cabal from a single village.
.
For the moment, the heavy U.S. military presence in search of Osama bin Laden and his Qaida terrorist network has muted such objections.
.
The writer, a former Pakistani diplomat and journalist, served as an adviser to Prime Ministers Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto. He contributed this comment to the International Herald Tribune. ISLAMABAD, Pakistan If recent history is any guide, the people of Afghanistan find it easier to reach agreements than to carry them out. The agreement that led to installation of an interim government in Kabul on Saturday, backed by the United Nations, is a diplomatic compromise that does not appear to take into account the aspirations of the warlords who hold real authority.
.
Hopes are being pinned on the prospect of international economic assistance and involvement of the world's major powers. But the capacity of Afghan warlords to undermine any deal should not be underestimated. Afghans have been at war for more than 20 years, first against the occupation by the Soviet Union and then among themselves. As a result, traditional institutions collapsed and new ones have not sufficiently taken hold. Demographics have been altered by emigration and the mass exodus of refugees. The old elite - royalists and intellectuals in exile - cannot relate to the new realities on the ground.
.
Previously ignored ethnic groups, such as the Shiite Hazaras, have gained power on the strength of having well-armed militias. The Uzbeks of the northwest, previously restricted to their home provinces, now seek a share in power in Kabul. Influential Pashtun tribal leaders of the past have lost ground to younger commanders. Docile mullahs have given way to aggressive mujahidin, while the Taliban regime empowered semi-literate peasants against their urbanized compatriots.
.
Diplomats usually find it easier to deal with diplomats, which gives English-speaking Afghans living in exile an advantage over unsophisticated military commanders during negotiations.
.
In 1992, when the first of several Afghan peace accords was signed in Peshawar, Sibghatullah Mujaddidi was appointed head of a six-month interim council. Within hours of the signing of the latest UN-brokered deal in Bonn, he predicted its failure. Six months is too short a time for an interim administration, he said.
.
The new consensus leader, Hamid Karzai, a respected Afghan patriot, has the unique advantage of being acceptable to the English-speaking diplomats and yet having a presence inside Afghanistan. He is a royalist without being a royal. If he seeks to extend the six-month tenure of his interim regime, he will face opposition from others who have deliberately kept the term short for their own personal or group advantage. The most serious opposition to the Bonn agreement has come from the same elements that led Afghanistan into the fratricidal civil war 10 years ago.
.
The Uzbek warlord Abdur Rashid Dostum, freshly armed and financed by the United States, is threatening to boycott the new Kabul government if he is not given the share in power that he demands.
.
The predominantly Pashtun Hezb-i-Islami, once led by Gulbeddin Hekmatyar but now divided into several factions, is also unhappy with its exclusion. Mr. Hekmatyar is best known for raining rockets on Kabul when, after being appointed Prime Minister in the early 1990s, he was denied entry into the capital by the troops of the late Ahmed Shah Massoud.
.
A hard-line Afghan theologian, Abdurrab Rasul Sayyaf, the only significant Pashtun leader in the Northern Alliance, wanted the Interior Ministry and is unhappy that he has not received it.
.
Leaders of the Hazara Hizb-i-Wahdat feel neglected in the power-sharing arrangement.
.
Add to the list of disgruntled leaders the names of Burhanuddin Rabbani, who loses the presidency, and Pir Syed Ahmed Gilani, head of the moderate Pashtun exiles based in Pakistan.
.
Most Afghan objections to the UN-sponsored agreement are based on the undue influence of the three younger Northern Alliance leaders, Interior Minister Yunus Qanuni, Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah and Defense Minister Mohammed Fahim. All three are ethnic Tajiks from the sparsely populated Panjshir Valley. Critics wonder at the representative character of an interim
For Related Topics See:
Front Page
Opinion & Editorial

< < Back to Start of Article ISLAMABAD, Pakistan If recent history is any guide, the people of Afghanistan find it easier to reach agreements than to carry them out. The agreement that led to installation of an interim government in Kabul on Saturday, backed by the United Nations, is a diplomatic compromise that does not appear to take into account the aspirations of the warlords who hold real authority.
.
Hopes are being pinned on the prospect of international economic assistance and involvement of the world's major powers. But the capacity of Afghan warlords to undermine any deal should not be underestimated. Afghans have been at war for more than 20 years, first against the occupation by the Soviet Union and then among themselves. As a result, traditional institutions collapsed and new ones have not sufficiently taken hold. Demographics have been altered by emigration and the mass exodus of refugees. The old elite - royalists and intellectuals in exile - cannot relate to the new realities on the ground.
.
Previously ignored ethnic groups, such as the Shiite Hazaras, have gained power on the strength of having well-armed militias. The Uzbeks of the northwest, previously restricted to their home provinces, now seek a share in power in Kabul. Influential Pashtun tribal leaders of the past have lost ground to younger commanders. Docile mullahs have given way to aggressive mujahidin, while the Taliban regime empowered semi-literate peasants against their urbanized compatriots.
.
Diplomats usually find it easier to deal with diplomats, which gives English-speaking Afghans living in exile an advantage over unsophisticated military commanders during negotiations.
.
In 1992, when the first of several Afghan peace accords was signed in Peshawar, Sibghatullah Mujaddidi was appointed head of a six-month interim council. Within hours of the signing of the latest UN-brokered deal in Bonn, he predicted its failure. Six months is too short a time for an interim administration, he said.
.
The new consensus leader, Hamid Karzai, a respected Afghan patriot, has the unique advantage of being acceptable to the English-speaking diplomats and yet having a presence inside Afghanistan. He is a royalist without being a royal. If he seeks to extend the six-month tenure of his interim regime, he will face opposition from others who have deliberately kept the term short for their own personal or group advantage. The most serious opposition to the Bonn agreement has come from the same elements that led Afghanistan into the fratricidal civil war 10 years ago.
.
The Uzbek warlord Abdur Rashid Dostum, freshly armed and financed by the United States, is threatening to boycott the new Kabul government if he is not given the share in power that he demands.
.
The predominantly Pashtun Hezb-i-Islami, once led by Gulbeddin Hekmatyar but now divided into several factions, is also unhappy with its exclusion. Mr. Hekmatyar is best known for raining rockets on Kabul when, after being appointed Prime Minister in the early 1990s, he was denied entry into the capital by the troops of the late Ahmed Shah Massoud.
.
A hard-line Afghan theologian, Abdurrab Rasul Sayyaf, the only significant Pashtun leader in the Northern Alliance, wanted the Interior Ministry and is unhappy that he has not received it.
.
Leaders of the Hazara Hizb-i-Wahdat feel neglected in the power-sharing arrangement.
.
Add to the list of disgruntled leaders the names of Burhanuddin Rabbani, who loses the presidency, and Pir Syed Ahmed Gilani, head of the moderate Pashtun exiles based in Pakistan.
.
Most Afghan objections to the UN-sponsored agreement are based on the undue influence of the three younger Northern Alliance leaders, Interior Minister Yunus Qanuni, Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah and Defense Minister Mohammed Fahim. All three are ethnic Tajiks from the sparsely populated Panjshir Valley. Critics wonder at the representative character of an interim regime that gives key portfolios and virtual control of government to a closely knit cabal from a single village.
.
For the moment, the heavy U.S. military presence in search of Osama bin Laden and his Qaida terrorist network has muted such objections.
.
The writer, a former Pakistani diplomat and journalist, served as an adviser to Prime Ministers Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto. He contributed this comment to the International Herald Tribune.